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Abstract—With continuous technological advancements, our
homes become smarter by interconnecting more and more
devices. Smart homes provide many advantages. However, they
also introduce new privacy and security risks. Recent studies
show that only a few people are aware of abstract risks, and
most people are not aware of specific negative consequences.
We developed a privacy and security awareness intervention
for people who want to inform themselves about risks in the
smart home context. Our intervention is based on research
literature on risk perception and feedback from both lay users
and security and privacy experts. We evaluated our intervention
regarding its influence on participants’ perceived threat, privacy
attitude, motivation to avoid threats, willingness to pay, and time
commitment to configure protective measures. The results of this
evaluation show a significant increase for all these aspects. We
also compared our intervention to information that users could
obtain during an Internet search on the topic. In this comparison,
our intervention evokes a significantly higher perceived threat
and privacy attitude. It showed no significant difference for the
other three scales. We discuss our findings in light of related
work.
Index Terms—smart home, risk intervention, security & pri-
vacy risk perception
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of smart home devices is rapidly growing with
expectations to exceed $53 billion in market size globally by
2022 [46]. Smart homes have many advantages for users such
as automation, remote control, and physical safety [5], [6].
But these advantages come alongside a variety of security and
privacy risks as shown and discussed in prior research [10],
[19]. These risks evolve in particular due to various network-
level issues (e.g. unencrypted exchange over WiFi) [2], [44]
as well as device- and application-level issues (e.g. granted
more privileges than needed, weak authentication, credentials
stored in plaintext, third-party security breaches) which can for
example lead to eavesdropping or “man-in-the-middle” attacks
[7], [19]. However, vendors of smart home devices do not
take action on educating their users on security and privacy
risks [30]. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that smart
home users were found to have a limited perception of security
and privacy risks. Indeed, research has shown that only few
people are aware of abstract risks and almost none are aware
of specific negative consequences (e.g. being stalked or not
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getting a job), for both smart home devices [23], [31], [48],
[54] and for other technologies [4], [27], [45].
Yet, an appropriate level of risk perception can be important
for users of smart home devices as a prerequisite to them
initiating actions to mitigate these risks. If users are not aware
of and do not perceive the security and privacy risks they face,
they will have little incentive to acquire knowledge on how to
protect themselves and their devices (e.g., configure devices
to optimize the privacy protection) [55].
This paper aims to provide an intervention that comprises
enough information to people interested in this topic to effec-
tively raise their perception of security and privacy risks of
smart homes and to motivate them to take protective actions
regarding their security and privacy when using smart home
devices. The intervention was designed based on literature on
risk communication, but considers as part of the development
process also feedback from security and privacy experts on the
one hand as well as lay smart home users on the other hand.
We evaluated the intervention’s effectiveness in an online
survey with 131 participants. The intervention shows a signif-
icant effect on people’s risk perception and motivation to use
protective measures. Compared to a simulated Internet search,
the intervention performs significantly better in raising risk
perception and shows no significant difference in motivating
to use protective measures.
II. RISK PERCEPTION INTERVENTION
In this section, we first provide an overview of the literature
our intervention is based on. Then, we describe the structure
and the content of our intervention. Last but not least, we
report on the feedback we got from experts and lay-users and
the improvements we derived from this feedback.
A. Background Literature
1) Misconceptions Regarding Trust in Manufacturer: Stud-
ies investigated reasons for smart home user’s lack of concern
about security and privacy risks. Zeng et al. [54] conducted
semi-structured interviews with smart home users. They dis-
covered that users on the one hand trust smart home manu-
facturers and third parties, while identifying these companies
most frequently as potential adversaries on the other hand.
Even if they acknowledge manufacturers as potential adver-
sarial actors, they feel not personally targeted and believe
their mitigation strategies are sufficient. In similar studies [53],
[55], this phenomenon is also explained by user’s trust in
smart home manufactures, especially their brand familiarity
and reputation. Trust in manufacturers was one of the drivers
of adopting smart home devices. Users believed that trusted
manufacturers already include adequate security and privacy
protection in their devices and were confident that no further
protective measures are required [55].
2) Mix of Abstract Risks and Specific Consequences: Our
research is built on the findings from Gerber et al. [24].
The authors investigate mental models on risk perception of
using smart home devices. In a between-subject study, the
authors asked lay users to rate four abstract and five specific
privacy risk scenarios according their probability and severity
– the two aspects of risks. Participants perceived abstract risk
scenarios as very likely but of medium severity. Whereas,
participants evaluated specific privacy risk scenarios as less
likely but of medium and high severity. Especially, risks
related to physical safety and financial loss were perceived as
the most severe. Thus the authors argue, that – to successfully
raise risk perception and motivate individuals to better protect
themselves – any intervention needs to include both abstract
risks and specific negative consequences. Furthermore, the
authors of [24] showed that severity and likelihood of several
concrete consequences were perceived very differently by
people, as not all consequences apply to everyone to the same
extent. Thus, to address a broad audience, it is necessary to
include concrete consequences from a broad scope of use cases
in an intervention.
3) Types of Concrete Negative Consequences: Karwatzki et
al. [29] conducted an extensive study to uncover individuals’
perceptions of negative consequences from data use. They
asked focus groups to name all possible privacy consequences
of a well established technology and categorized them into
the following seven types of consequences: physical, social,
resource-related, psychological, prosecution-related, career-
related and freedom-related.
4) Communicating Risks: Garg & Camp [22] investigated
how users perceive security and privacy risks in online en-
vironments. They asked 93 participants in a survey to rate
different aspects of security and privacy risks to identify
dimensions of online risks. They found that the factor of time
has the biggest influence in shaping risk perception. Older
risks and risks closer to the physical world are better under-
stood and considered more hazardous. They explained their
findings with previous results from [35] and [49]. Van Schaik
et al. [50] conducted an online study with 436 UK and US
students to investigate cyber-security hazards. They found that
identity theft is among the risks that evoked the highest risk
perception, which is in line with results from Garg & Camp
[22]. Furthermore, in [11], Camp suggests to link security risks
to crimes. This approach lets people experience themselves
better as potential victims and call for action. Additionally,
interventions should explain complex security aspects in an
understandable fashion, e.g., using simple language. Without
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Fig. 1: The intervention and the input used for its development.
B. Structure and Content
The intervention’s first section presents the point of view
of smart home manufacturers on security and privacy issues
to explain their motivation on potential data leaks and short-
cuts manufacturers might take in the protection of their users.
The goal in this is to address the findings described in
Section II-A1, i.e., allowing individuals to understand the
misconception surrounding all manufacturers’ trustworthiness.
Then, the intervention includes a section on security and
thereafter one on privacy. Following the findings from Sec-
tion II-A2, we first provide in each of these two sections
abstract risks followed by a number of specific consequences.
The text on abstract privacy risks is based on the one used in
[24]. The text on abstract security risks has a similar style.
We made sure to include at least one specific consequence
per category from Section II-A3. We also made sure that spe-
cific consequences speaking to different groups of individuals
were included, thereby following the recommendations in [24].
Furthermore, in the formulation of the specific consequences,
the findings from Section II-A4 were considered. For example,
we linked specific consequences to well-known crimes from
the physical world, e.g., targeted burglaries by creating user
profiles to determine absence from home or by taking control
of smart doors and windows. Note, the specific privacy related
consequences which we included in the intervention were
inspired by the messages tested in [24].
The input used during the development of the intervention
is depicted in Fig. 1 and the final content of the intervention
in Fig. 2. Note that this final version of the content already
includes modifications based on feedback from experts and lay
users as outlined in the next section (Section II-C).
C. Collecting and Integrating Feedback
In two rounds of feedback, the intervention was first
checked by several security and privacy experts regarding its
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Studies show that many users of smart home devices and applications 
assume that their devices already offer maximum protection of their 
privacy or security by default - i.e. before purchase. This assumption is 
problematic for the following reasons: 
There are manufacturers that do not want to offer maximum protection or 
are not able to guarantee it. For example,  
• some manufacturers are interested in collecting additional data to sell 
them profitably;  
• some manufacturers have deliberately decided against offering the 
best possible protection, because maximum privacy and security come 
at a high cost and involve compromises in functionality; 
• some manufacturers are motivated to offer the highest possible 
protection, but are not even able to do this due to the complexity of 






Hackers can harm you in many ways: if hackers have gained access to your 
smart home devices, they can spy on data and information stored in or 
generated by these devices. In addition, they can control and change the 




• take control of cameras or other sensors (this can be used for example 
to capture sensitive data such as videos or photos of you),  
• change room temperatures significantly (this will for instance cause 
your plants or animals in the house to suffer) 
• switch off the refrigerator or freezer or manipulate food preparation 
equipment (this might lead to spoiled food or water leaks), 
• manipulate smoke detectors (e.g. this causes loud noises 
spontaneously and without reason), 
• modify washing machine and dryer programs (this might, for example, 
destroy clothes or increase your water and electricity bills) 
• put a heavy load on connected devices (this will reduce the device’s life 
span or might even destroy the device) 
• open doors and windows (this affect, e.g., the room temperature or 
unauthorized intruders might be able to enter your home) 
• take control of remote maintenance devices, such as smart meters (this 
can be used, e.g., to switch devices in the house on/off or to transmit 








The manufacturers of Smart Home devices collect a wide range of data and 
information, e.g., credit cards, online purchases, current room 
temperature, searches made, light activity, weight, or movements inside 
the house. At best, all this is necessary to provide the desired functionality.  
However, your usage habits can also be derived from this data (e.g., on 
which days you turn on lights and heating, when you do the laundry, which 
food you buy online, or your preferences for delivery of bought goods). This 
enables manufacturers to create comprehensive usage profiles of you. At 
best, these are used by the manufacturers of your devices or your smart 
home applications to improve the services. 
However, if the data collected and/or the user profiles created fall into the 
hands of third parties (e.g., because criminals hack into the manufacturer's 
systems, usually because they are not sufficiently protected) or are used by 
the manufacturer for purposes other than the ones expected by you, you 
may suffer damage in many ways.  
Examples of this are: 
 
• The combination of light activity, temperature control, and power 
consumption can be used to carry out targeted burglaries.  
• Your health data (e.g. medical records, current blood pressure, 
medications) might reduce your chances when applying for a new job 
or may lead to losing your job, in case the data is disclosed to your 
current or potential employer 
• Your location data can make you a victim of stalking, in case the data 
ends up with third parties. 
• The combination of dietary preferences, orders, and light activity may 
be passed on to your insurance company. These data might be used to 
enforce changes to your personal life and habits or in case of non-
compliance force you into a more expensive or overall worse insurance 
policy. 
• When submitted to third parties and linked to a profile, your general 
personal information (e.g., name, address, gender, or bank details) 
might be used to assume your digital identity, publish inappropriate 
content on your behalf, send dangerous messages (such as phishing 
messages or messages with dangerous attachments) on your behalf, or 
conduct financial transactions on your behalf. 
• Your health data might lead to your receiving worse conditions for a 
loan, in case it is passed on to your bank. 
• Your personal preferences, might be used to specifically influence your 
buying decisions or make products you are likely to buy more expensive 
in online shops, in case your preferences are given or sold to other 
companies. 
• Your data about your housing conditions (e.g. by mapping your home) 
can be used to draw conclusions about your financial situation and thus 
lead to more expensive interest rates, e.g. for mail orders. 
• Your preferences with regard to television and Internet broadcasts as 
well as your communications data can be used to influence your 
decisions, e.g. in political elections. 
• Having your audio or video data disclosed to a third party might make 
you feel uncomfortable and might lead to you feeling uneasy in your 
home. This in turn might limit your activities/behavior or might make 
you feel restricted in living your personal life. 
 
 
Manufacturer’s Point of View 
Abstract Security Risks 
Specific Security Consequences 
Abstract Privacy Risks 
Specific Privacy Consequences 
All of the above are examples that have already been encountered in practice. The danger arising from the collection and evaluation of your usage behavior 
data and information is that – as of today – it is impossible to predict what can be learned from the data in the future, e.g., what illnesses a person has or the 
truthfulness of statements you make to other people. The above-mentioned security and privacy risks do not only affect you. As an owner of smart home 
devices and applications, you also expose your guests to many of these risks. 
Further Security and Privacy Considerations 
Fig. 2: Smart home security and privacy risk perception intervention. Highlighted sections are additions from experts.
a) Expert Feedback: We had the chance to gather feed-
back from consortium partners of our EU project on smart
homes. These partners were experts in the domain of smart
home security and privacy from academia and industry. They
were asked to check for completeness, i.e., are any important
or frequently occurring specific security and privacy conse-
quences missing. They listed a number of further specific
consequences. As there were too many to be included, we
discussed with them how to proceed. We agreed on adding
three further privacy consequences, i.e., one psychological and
two resource-oriented. The experts also mentioned, that the
key advantage of increased functionality when smart home
devices are connected to a network and interconnect with
other smart home devices or access online resources, can
cause security threats when their network access is not well
protected. Thus, we added two security related consequences
to emphasize the importance of network protection. Moreover,
based on the experts’ feedback and a discussion of this
feedback, we decided to add a paragraph on ’Further Security
and Privacy Considerations’ to the intervention. The added
risks are displayed highlighted in Fig. 2.
b) Lay User Feedback: Thanks to the same EU project,
almost 50 lay smart home users could be asked to read and
feedback the intervention as well. Those lay users agreed for
the EU project as a whole to participate in trials, i.e., having
smart home technology installed in their homes together with
a security/privacy gateway. We asked the participants to read
the text and let us know what is unclear, what they like, and
what they do not like. The feedback was collected by the
partners in the respective countries and languages. Afterwards,
the feedback was discussed with the partners and changes to
the intervention were derived. This included a number of small
changes. Some lay users remarked that the intervention is
relatively long. However, the length of the text was necessary
to include the findings from Section II-A. We argue that
the intervention’s use for educational purposes warrants the
inclusion of all the information. Thus, we decided to leave the
high density of information in the intervention unchanged.
III. EVALUATION OF THE INTERVENTION
This section outlines our research questions and hypotheses.
Then, our user study, recruiting process and ethical consider-
ations, as well as the analysis methodology are presented.
A. Research Questions and Hypotheses
Our intervention aims to raise the perception of security
and privacy risks in the smart home context. The two research
questions presented in the remainder of this section serve to
assess the effectiveness of this intervention.
1) RQ-1 — Raising Risk Perception: The first aspect we
aim to investigate is raising the risk perception of our partic-
ipants. The research question guiding this investigation is:
RQ-1: What is the effect of our intervention on people’s
perception of privacy and security risks of smart home?
Based on the literature presented in Section II-A we assume
the presence of an effect on our participants’ perception of
security and privacy risks. Therefore, we formulated two hy-
potheses to assess the participants’ threat perception (HPT−1
and HPT−2) and two hypotheses to assess their privacy
attitude (HPA−1 and HPA−2). In the following, we present
each of the four hypotheses and describe the scales used in
our questionnaires for the respective assessments.
a) Perceived Threat: The two hypotheses pertaining to
the effect of our participants’ threat perception are:
HPT−1: Our awareness intervention significantly increases
people’s security and privacy threat perception in the context
of smart home.
HPT−2: Our awareness intervention increases people’s se-
curity and privacy threat perception in the context of smart
home significantly higher than interventions available on the
Internet.
We investigated the effect on perceived threat using the scales
from the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) by
Liang & Xue [34]. Their items for perceived threat were
developed based on the substantial meaning [42]. We adapted
the items from Liang & Xue used in [34]. The adaptation was
necessary to reflect the different context, i.e. from spyware
to smart home security and privacy risks and refer to threats
to user’s security and privacy (see Table I for the adopted
questions). Instead of the Likert scale we decided to use
the Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). VAS is a continuous line
displaying the labels ”strongly disagree” and ”strongly agree”
at either end. The participants can select any value between the
two ends of the line continuously on a range of one to 101. By
using VAS we avoid the disadvantages of Likert scale, such as
bias through response style or ordinal measurement data [47].
b) Privacy Attitude: The two hypotheses pertaining to
the effect on our participants’ privacy attitude are:
HPA−1: The awareness intervention has a significant effect on
people’s privacy attitude with respect to smart homes in terms
of higher privacy concerns.
HPA−2: The awareness intervention has a significantly higher
effect on people’s privacy attitude with respect to smart
homes in terms of higher privacy concerns than interventions
available on the Internet.
Our items to measure participants’ privacy attitude are based
on those proposed by Dienlin & Trepte [16] who used them
to investigate online privacy behaviour in the context of social
networks. They developed the items based on the guidelines
of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) [20]. They use six
different semantic differentials which are either bi-dimensional
(e.g. bad vs. good) or uni-dimensional (e.g. worrying vs.
not worrying). The statement preceding the differentials were
adapted to the context of our study. Analogously to perceived
threat, VAS were used here, too (i.e., from ”very bad”=1 to
”very good”=101).
2) RQ-2 — Motivation to Use Protective Measures: The
second aspect we aim to investigate in our study is the par-
ticipants’ motivation to use protective measures. The research
question guiding this investigation is:
RQ-2: Does our intervention have an effect on individuals’
motivation to use protective measures to reduce privacy and
security risks in the smart home context?
To our knowledge the available research does not allow
formulating directed hypotheses with respect to RQ-2. Thus,
its investigation is explorative in nature. To answer RQ-2, we
measured our participants avoidance motivation, willingness
to pay for protective measures, and time commitment for
configuring protective measures. We investigate the effect on
avoidance motivation using the scale from the TTAT suggested
by Liang & Xue [34] which was also adapted to the context of
our study. Their items were derived from behavioural intention
measures by Davis et al. [13], [14] (see Table I for the
adaptations we made). To measure willingness to pay for
protective measures, we simply asked participants to state the
maximum amount of money they would spend on protective
measures. Participants could specify the amount of money in
Euros by typing it in a given text box. Similar questions were
stated in [9], [21] to measure willingness to pay. We assessed
user’s time commitment for configuring the protective measure
by asking the maximum amount of time they would take for
configuration. Participants got a text box to specify the amount
of time.
B. Study Design
We used a within-subject study design to measure the effect
of our intervention as well as a between-subject study design
to compare our intervention with the baseline group. An online
survey was conducted. The survey was implemented in SoSci
Survey and conducted in Germany. The interventions as well
as the questions were provided in German. In particular, the
scales from the literature were translated to German using
the back-translation technique. The procedure of the study is
depicted in Fig. 3 and described in the following paragraphs.
Phase 1: Participants were first shown some information
about the study and asked to consent to participate in the study
and the processing of their data (see Section III-D for more
details). Then, they were asked about their experience with
smart home devices and their motivation to use them.
Phase 2: Participants were asked to answer a number of
questions on perceived threat, privacy attitudes, avoidance
motivation, willingness to pay and time commitment for
configuration of protective measures. These are the items
introduced in the previous subsection.
Phase 3: Participants were assigned to either the study
group or the baseline group at random. The baseline group had
access to a simulated Google search result (see Section III-C
for more details). Since the search results presented to the
baseline group also contained descriptions of the term smart
home and mentioned advantages of smart homes, we added
to our intervention a short description about smart homes and
their advantages for the study group participants as well. Both
groups were instructed to inform themselves about advantages
and disadvantages regarding smart homes. Note, we used this
more neutral wording in an attempt to minimize the bias
towards only disadvantages and not prime the participants
unnecessarily. Both participant groups were able to read the
provided information as long as they wanted; but had to do so
for a minimum for four minutes before they could advance to
the next phase of the study. This was implemented to increase
the likelihood that they take their time. The four minutes were
based on a pre-study in which we asked people to read the
text very carefully and the minimum time taken in this pre-
study was four minutes. We implemented one more check:
Participants of the baseline group had to click on at least one
of the search results before being allowed to proceed. Such a
restriction was not necessary for the study group, as there was
only one intervention.
Phase 4: The participants had to answer the same questions
as during phase two again. This phase also contained two
attention check questions to filter out participants who did not
read the instructions carefully.
Phase 5: The survey concluded with questions on partici-
pants’ demographics. Last but not least, we thanked partici-
pants for their participation.
C. Baseline Group
Participants in the baseline group were shown the top ten
Google search results based on the search term ”smart home
Welcome & Informed Consent
Answering Experience with Smart Home
Answering Scales For All Research Questions
Reading Smart Home Description & 
Advantages + Our Intervention
Answering Scales For All Research Questions
Demographics Thanks
Study Group
Reading Google Search Results
Baseline Group
Fig. 3: Procedure of the user survey.
/ IoT security and privacy risks”. We decided to provide the
top ten results, as research on browsing behaviour shows that
attention and click rates sharply drop after the tenth result,
which is the number of results Google presents on the first
page [25], [28]. Participants saw a simulated search overview
in the survey, recreating the look and feel of a real Google
search. They were able to choose and read the individual
search results by clicking on them in the search overview.
After reading the content of the website they could return to
the search overview at any time and choose another one of
the search results. To decrease the ordering bias, the order of
the search results in the overview was randomised for each
participant.
D. Recruiting and Ethics
Participants were recruited from the Clickworker panel
which is a crowdsourcing platform similar to Amazon Me-
chanical Turk, geared towards German speaking individuals
[15]. Based on our pre-studies, we determined the duration of
answering the survey to be 16 minutes. The minimum wage
in Germany at the time of the study was 9.50 Euros per hour.
Thus, participant’s received 2.60 Euros for finishing the survey.
All ethical requirements defined by our university’s ethics
committee for research with human participants were met. In
particular, on the first page of the survey, participants received
a informed consent by revealing the study’s purpose and data
processing. For any doubts or questions regarding the study,
contact information of the researchers were given in the survey.
Participants had the option to withdraw from the study at
any point without providing any reason by closing the tab
of their browser with the survey. They were also instructed
that by cancelling the survey, all data collected so far would
be deleted. Participants were assured that their responses
are stored in an anonymised form and would only be used
for study purposes. In the beginning, participants were also
explicitly advised that the survey contains attention questions.
E. Analysis of the Results
To assess the effect of the intervention, the aforementioned
scales were measured twice, i.e. before and after the interven-
tion. Therefore, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA
for each scale. Furthermore, the effect sizes proposed by
Morris and DeShon [38], [39] were calculated for each of
Scales Original Adapted to this study
Perceived Threat Spyware poses a threat to me Smart home devices pose a threat to my security and privacy
The trouble caused by spyware threatens me The trouble caused by smart home devices threaten my security and
privacy
Spyware is a danger to my computer Smart home devices are a danger to my security and privacy
It is dreadful if my computer is infected by
spyware
It is terrible, when my security and privacy is violated by smart home
devices
It is risky to use my computer if it has
spyware
Using smart home devices is a risk to my security and privacy
Avoidance Motivation I intend to use anti-spyware software to
avoid spyware
I intend to collect information on protective measures that will increase
my security and better protect my privacy when using smart home
devices.
I predict I would use anti-spyware software
to avoid spyware
I predict I would collect information on protective measures that will
increase my security and better protect my privacy when using smart
home devices.
I plan to use anti-spyware software to avoid
spyware
I plan to collect information on protective measures that will increase
my security and better protect my privacy when using smart home
devices.
TABLE I: Scales by Liang & Xue for measuring perceived threat and avoidance motivation: original items and adapted items
used for this paper
the scales in the repeated ANOVA. Cohen [12] suggested to
categorize an effect as medium for d ≥ 0.5 and as large for
d ≥ 0.8. To compare our intervention with the intervention in
the baseline group we looked at statistical differences of these
measurements. We used a mixed design ANOVA adding the
type of the intervention as the between-subject factor.
IV. RESULTS
Overall, 159 participants completed the survey and passed
the attention questions. 28 of them were excluded due to giving
answers which were identified as outliers deviating more than
1.5-times the interquartile range from the mean. An overview
of the demographics of the remaining 131 participants can be
found in Tab. II. The remainder of this section presents the
results of our study along our two research questions.
TABLE II: Participant demographics.
All Baseline Group Study Group
Age
N % N % N %
<20 2 1.5 2 3.0 0 0.0
20-25 27 20.6 17 25.8 12 17.4
26-35 50 38.2 20 30.3 30 43.5
36-45 27 20.6 16 24.2 11 15.9
46-55 14 10.7 5 7.6 9 13.0
56-65 10 7.6 6 9.1 4 5.8
>65 1 0.8 0 0.0 1 1.4
Gender
N % N % N %
m 78 59.5 39 59.1 39 56.5
w 62 39.7 25 37.9 27 39.1
n/a 1 0.8 0 0.0 1 1.4
Smart home
device owner
N % N % N %
yes 78 59.5 36 56.3 42 62.7
no 53 40.5 28 43.7 25 37.3
IT expertise Average 1.641 1.554 1.724SD 3.985 3.308 4.537
A. RQ-1 – Raising Risk Perception
In order to determine the effect of our awareness interven-
tion on people’s risk perception, we measured the participants’
perceived threat (to evaluate HPT−1 and HPT−2) and privacy
attitude (to evaluate HPA−1 and HPA−2).
With respect to HPT−1 and HPA−1, it becomes apparent
from the values in Table III that both scales exhibit better
scores after reading the intervention, i.e., increase for per-
ceived threat and decrease for privacy attitude. Perceived threat
being initially at 45.2 on the range of 1 to 101 increased by
61% to 72.9. Privacy attitude was initially at 52.7 on the same
range and decreased by 31% to 36.5. ANOVA tests showed
that reading our intervention led to a significant effect on
both, perceived threat (F (1) = 78.2, p = .001) and privacy
attitude (F (1) = 57.5, p = .001). The effect sizes pertaining
to the scales were d = 1.103 (large) and d = -0.948 (large)
respectively. Privacy attitude shows a negative effect size as
the rating score decreases when the privacy concerns increase.
Thus, we accept HPT−1 and HPA−1.
Furthermore, we looked at the differences in our partici-
pants’ perceived threat and privacy attitude between the group
reading our intervention and the baseline group. Overall, the
effect of the simulated Internet search in the baseline group
was less than the effect evoked by our intervention (see
Table III). ANOVA tests showed that the differences were
significant for both scales: perceived threat (F (1) = 4.7,
p = .033) and privacy attitude (F (1) = 9.7, p = .002). Thus,
the improvement in perceived threat and privacy attitude is
significantly higher for our intervention and we accept HPT−2
and HPA−2.
B. RQ-2 – Motivation to Use Protective Measures
To investigate the effect on people’s motivation to use
protective measures, we measured our participants’ avoidance
motivation, willingness to pay, and time commitment for con-
figuration before and after the intervention. All three scales ex-
hibit better scores after reading the intervention (see Table III).
Avoidance motivation started at 53.4 on a range of 1 to 101 and
increased by 24% to 66.2. Willingness to pay for protective
measures was at 70,2 Euros and increased by 41% to 99 Euros.
Time commitment for configuring protective measures being
at 56 minutes increased by 33% to 74.4 minutes. Reading
our intervention lead to a significant effect on avoidance
Study Group Baseline Group Difference between Groups
Before Difference Before Difference Sig. F-Value
Perceived Threat (VAS) 45.2 27.7 46.2 19.0 0.033* 4.7
Privacy Attitude (VAS) 52.7 -16.2 49.1 -7.2 0.002* 9.7
Avoidance Motivation (VAS) 53.4 12.8 49.4 12.1 0.844 0.04
Willingness to Pay (C) 70.2 28.8 70.6 26.8 0.830 0.05
Time Commitment for Configuration (min) 56.0 18.4 46.8 13.4 0.336 0.9
TABLE III: Mean values before the intervention and difference after the intervention for each scale of the study group and
the baseline group; Significance levels and F-values of the difference between the groups
Study Group Baseline Group
Scale F-Value Significance Level d F-Value Significance Level d
Perceived Threat (VAS) 78.2 0.001* 1.103 55.5 0.001* 0.940
Privacy Attitude (VAS) 57.5 0.001* -0.948 13.7 0.001* -0.466
Avoidance Motivation (VAS) 27.7 0.001* 0.648 25.3 0.001* 0.634
Willingness to Pay (C) 21.8 0.001* 0.666 14.2 0.001* 0.516
Time Commitment for Configuration (min) 21.7 0.001* 0.628 16.3 0.001* 0.566
TABLE IV: F-Values, significance levels and effect sizes of the study group and the baseline group for each scale
motivation (F (1) = 27.7, p = .001), user’s willingness to
pay (F (1) = 21.8, p = .001), and time commitment for
configuring protective measures (F (1) = 21.7, p = .001). The
effect sizes pertaining to the scales were d = 0.648 (medium),
d = 0.666 (medium), and d = 0.628 (medium) respectively.
The effect on avoidance motivation, willingness to pay
and time commitment for configuration was not significantly
different between our intervention and the baseline group.
Similar to our intervention, the effect sizes in the baseline
group were medium, too.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss our study’s results, limitations
and future work as well as related work.
A. Effectiveness of the Intervention
Two research questions guided our evaluation of the inter-
ventions effectiveness. In the following, we discuss the results
and implications pertaining to each of them.
1) RQ-1 — Raising Risk Perception: To investigate the ef-
fectiveness of our intervention with respect to raising people’s
risk perception, we investigated the intervention’s effect on
the participants’ perceived threat and their privacy attitude.
Our intervention seemed to evoke a significant increase in
perceived threat with a large effect size of d = 1.103.
According to the TTAT by Liang & Xue [33], perceived threat
is determined by the perceived severity and probability of
risks. Thus, we can confirm that following the guidelines in
Section II-A2 for increasing both of these factors was effective
and our results support these earlier findings. Furthermore, the
increase in threat perception was significantly higher for our
intervention than in the baseline group, implying an advantage
in terms of evoking threat perception for systematically created
interventions over freely available information on the Internet.
Our intervention also changed people’s privacy attitudes
towards higher privacy concerns significantly. The increase
was significantly higher compared to the baseline group, which
will be also reflected by the effect sizes with d = -0.948 for
our intervention and d = -0.466 for the baseline intervention.
Furthermore, according to Dienlin & Trepte, with an increase
in privacy attitude we can expect to have a positive effect on
people’s privacy behaviour.
2) RQ-2 — Motivation to Use Protective Measures: The
TTAT explains that when people perceive threat they sub-
sequently adopt coping behaviour to avoid the threat. Thus,
with an increase in perceived threat avoidance motivation
should increase as well. We can confirm this relationship
with our measurements for the smart home context. Avoidance
motivation shows a significant increase after the intervention.
Also willingness to pay for protective measures and the time
commitment for configuring protective measures increased
significantly after the intervention. Hence, we argue that with
interventions based on the findings in the literature as well as
feedback from experts and lay users, it is possible to foster
security and privacy protective behaviour.
Yet, the effect sizes are not as high as for the perceived
threat. The effect size of avoidance motivation is just slightly
higher for our intervention than for the baseline group. Also,
while the the group which read through our intervention shows
a higher increase in threat perception than the baseline group,
there is no significant difference in avoidance motivation
between the two. One possible explanation might be the
convex relationship between threat perception and avoidance
motivation reported in [33] and depicted in Figure 4. After
an initial stark increase, any additional increase in threat
perception causes a lower growth rate in avoidance motivation.
It is possible that the threat level of the baseline group reached
a point where a significant increase in threat perception with a
large effect does not cause a significant increase in avoidance
motivation anymore.
Additionally, TTAT describes that aside from threat percep-
tion, threat avoidability has a positive influence on avoidance
motivation (which is in turn moderated by perceived threat)
[32], [33]. However, since our study did not include avoid-
ability as a construct, we cannot draw definite conclusions
and further studies to investigate this aspect are needed.
Fig. 4: The curvilinear relationship between perceived threat
and avoidance motivation
The set of factors which influence privacy protective be-
haviour is very diverse and complex. Acquisti et al. [3] demon-
strate that both psychological and economic factors influence
people’s desire and ability to protect their privacy. While the
details of these factors are beyond the scope of this paper, it
is important to note that through providing the intervention,
we are addressing some of the psychological factors, e.g.
information asymmetries, intangibility of the risks, or illusory
control. However, other psychological factors, e.g., herding,
adaptation, or bounded rationality remain unaddressed.
B. Limitations and Future Work
The study has some limitations which should be considered
when interpreting the results. The intervention was evaluated
with participants from Germany. People with different cultural
backgrounds show differences in the level of security and
privacy awareness in the smart home context [31]. Therefore, it
would be helpful to investigate the cultural differences’ impact
on the intervention’s effectiveness and adapt it, if necessary.
Participants of the study were recruited from the Click-
worker panel. Considering previous studies on crowdwork
[17], [26], our sample might be biased with respect to partici-
pants’ age, educational background, and technical experience.
For the selection of the top ten results participants were
given in the baseline group, we used a clean browser to avoid
bias. However, it must be acknowledged that variations in
search engines, search terms, and search results can affect the
results of our study. However, we argue that using the search
results obtained in a clean browser on Google – the search
engine with the biggest market share – represents the best
approximation of what an average person might find.
We consider our participants’ intention regarding their will-
ingness to pay and their time commitment. It was too challeng-
ing to run a field experiment to measure actual behaviour, in
particular during the current pandemic. Therefore, the online
survey design was the only viable option to us.
The next challenge in future work is to reach people with
the intervention. Potential means to distribute the intervention
could be media entities, agencies, organisations, and schools.
Also the manufacturers of smart home devices can use the
intervention to explain how they reduce these risks. Text-based
materials are helpful for providing details in a structured way
and allow distribution either in digital or print form. However,
when informing end-users, adaptation of the content into other
formats such as a video or as interactive media might render
it more fun and easier accessible [1].
In our study we measured the effect of the intervention
directly after reading it. We do not know the long-term
effects of the intervention. Thus, it might prove worthwhile to
investigate the intervention’s effectiveness after some months.
C. Related Work
A wide variety of research aims at making people aware
of privacy risks pertaining to the smart home devices they
have in place by analysing, visualising, or interpreting infor-
mation flows, e.g., [36], [40], [43]. But they do not provide
educational material which explains risks and consequences
of privacy exposure. Another line of research proposes to
introduce security and privacy labels for IoT products [18],
[37]. This information might be more helpful during the
buying decision, but does not outline potential consequences.
Williams et al. [52] investigated a game for smart watches to
encourage privacy-protective behaviour of smart watch users.
The authors suggested to provide more information, as not
all participants adjusted their behaviour and complained about
being insufficiently informed. Plachkinova & Menard [41]
examined smart home security awareness videos. Our study
is focused on a text-based awareness intervention maintaining
a high information density for in depth learning.
VI. CONCLUSION
We systematically developed a novel security and privacy
awareness intervention to raise people’s risk perception for
security and privacy risks in the smart home context. Two
pillars support the intervention: firstly, the existing research
literature, and secondly, feedback from lay users and experts.
We evaluated the effectiveness of our intervention in an online
study. Reading through the intervention significantly increased
participant’s risk perception and willingness to use protective
measures. In comparison to a simulated Internet search on
the topic, the effect of the intervention on risk perception
was significantly higher. Based on previous research, e.g., by
Dienlin & Trepte [16], it is reasonable to assume that this
effect positively impacts actual privacy behavior. Furthermore,
we can confirm the TTAT [33] in the smart home context, since
our study shows that an increase in perceived threat also causes
an increase in avoidance motivation. Based on these findings,
our intervention contributes to making the complexity of smart
homes and the associated risks tangible even for lay people.
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